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DDoS Attacks Targeting Back-end Database Resources
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Abstract—Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks tar-
geting the application layer are becoming more prevalent due to
a lack of suitable defence solutions. Existing research treats the
web server environment as a black box, by only monitoring the
edge network traffic; however, we believe that this approach
limits the accuracy of the detection system as it does not
protect the back-end database servers. In this paper we propose
a new sensor located within the back-end system, which can
produce additional database features. This allows for real-time
insight into the actual database workload caused by each user
enabling the detection of DDoS attacks targeting high database
consumption resources. These resource metrics are analysed in
real-time on a live website, using a decision tree classification
engine. Our preliminary results show that a low rate asymmetric
attack as low as 1 request every 10 seconds can be detected using
these proposed features.
Index Terms—Application Layer, DDoS, Sensor, Backend,
Back-end, Database, SQL Database, HTTP, Asymmetric, Detec-
tion, Boosted Ensemble, Decision Trees
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks attempt to
make a network or server unavailable to its intended users.
DDoS attacks targeting web services poses a serious threat to
everyday life as we see more and more critical services being
provided on the internet. In the Arbor Network infrastructure
security report volume X [1], it states that in 2014, 38%
of respondents experienced more than 21 attacks per month.
There are various motivations behind these attacks, including
political and criminal activity, however the motivations behind
the attack are often unknown [1]. Regardless the attacks still
cause considerable disruption to the organisations involved.
The first widespread DDoS attack was in 2000 when Mafi-
aboy, a 15 year old hacker, took down Amazon, CNN, Dell,
eBay and Yahoo [2]. Historically, DDoS attacks have targeted
the network layer, aiming to take the network devices offline
by consuming the bandwidth, TCP connections, memory or
processing power of the network switches and firewalls.
In recent years, it has been found that the application
layer could be attacked using much lower bandwidth. The
attacker can cause the application running on the end server
to consume large computational resources with relatively low
request rates, causing a denial of service. One example is
Slowloris, a DDoS tool that targeted a flaw with Apache, a
popular web server application [3]. Due to the low bandwidth
requirements of Slowloris, anonymous networks such as TOR
network could be used to hide the origin of the attacker.
High rate application flood attacks have also been used to
consume the server’s resources, the most popular being Low
Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) which was used by Anonymous
to attack Paypal and Visa by flooding it with HTTP GET
requests. Attackers may also rent a botnet from an online
marketplace, allowing for a DDoS attack to be launched just
from a few clicks on their web browser.
Currently, most DDoS attacks are based on the network
layer [4]; however, due to the adaptation of Content Delivery
Networks (CDN) and deployment of network layer security
appliances, the application layer is becoming the new attack
front for DDoS.
The latest DDoS attacks are using an asymmetric attack
method in which highly computational resources are targeted.
The BBC website was successfully attacked on the 31 Dec
2015 by a DDoS attack which affected the back-end database,
taking the BBC website offline for three hours [5]. Although
in-depth analysis of the attack has not been released, it is
likely that the attackers targeted webpages, which required
heavy database access. Also in 2016 the Mirai botnet was
used to attack websites with HTTP flood attacks of up to 1.7
million requests per second [6] suggesting that botnets are
transitioning to application layer attacks.
In this paper we propose a approach for detecting applica-
tion layer DDoS attacks targeting resources containing large
database queries. We monitor the queries going to the database
and uniquely trace them to the originating user, allowing us to
build a database usage profile for each individual. This allows
us to detect users trying to overload the back-end server. This
sensing technique is our novel contribution.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing research on the detection of network layer DDoS
attacks is ineffective at detecting application layer attacks
as these attacks target flaws within the application protocol,
which is only present in the payload. This prevents traditional
IPS (Intrusion Prevention Systems) from detecting any ab-
normal behaviour, as the TCP connection is valid. Over the
last few years, research concentrating on the application layer
has been carried out; however, we believe a suitable detection
solution has yet to be found.
Flow rate statistics have been proposed in [7]–[11] to detect
an attack based on request rate timings; however, this detection
method assumes the request rate is proportional to the damage
inflicted on the server, which this paper will later prove to be
over-simplistic.
User browsing behaviour analysis has been proposed using
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) by Yi Xie et al. [12]–[15]
to detect abnormal behaviour. They assume that an attacker
would access random pages during the attack, therefore by
monitoring each user’s movement through the website, ma-
licious browsing behaviour can be detected using complex
behaviour analysis. C. Xu et al [16] extended this detection
method using the random walk model to specifically detect
asymmetric attacks.
Hidden decoy links have been proposed by D. Gavrilis
et al. [17] as bots may automatically navigate through the
websites by clicking on links, Gavrilis creates hidden links
which are not visible to a human therefore if they are clicked
on, it will trigger a bot alert. G. Oikonomou and J. Mirkovic
[18] progressed this research by creating more sophisticated
types of hidden resources to decrease the possibility of the
bot detecting the decoy.
Active protection methods such as CAPTCHAs are regu-
larly seen in industry; however, they require human interaction
and cause irritation to users. With the advancement of image
processing [19] it is hard to predict how much longer they will
be effective against bots. Researchers have proposed further
puzzle methods such as resource consumption puzzles by
Dean Drew and Adam Stubblefield [20], which prompts the
client to perform a cryptography hash sequence before gaining
access to the server’s resources.
Defense by offense was proposed by M. Walfish [21], who
avoided the detection stage and instead persuaded each user to
fight for their fair allocation of the resources using Speakup.
Clients would be encouraged to increase their traffic rate
during a DDoS attack hence giving genuine traffic a higher
percentage of the available bandwidth and minimising the
affect of the DDoS attack.
Pandiyarajan et al. [22] proposed a method of detecting
attacks targeting URLs with heavy database queries. They
approximated the database usage by counting the number of
variables in the GET request; however, there is no guarantee
that the variables are used for a database query, and therefore
cannot give accurate visibility on the resource’s database
usage.
III. CHALLENGES OF DEFENDING AGAINST APPLICATION
LAYER DDOS
To successfully defend against a DDoS attack, the following
conditions must be met.
• The detection tool must use fewer computational re-
sources to defend the attack than the cost of building
more server resources
• Must not adversely affect genuine user’s quality of ser-
vice, otherwise the system will not be adopted
• Must not allow the attacker to easily circumvent the
protection by adjusting their attack behaviour
• Capable of stopping both low and high rate request
attacks.
Existing research does not meet the above criteria. Request
rate statistics cannot detect slow rate request attacks targeting
high value targets, this research assumes that the request rate
is proportionate to the damage caused which is not the case
for asymmetric attacks as will be later shown in this paper.
User browsing behaviour analysis requires large computa-
tional power which will be unable to cope with the large level
of traffic present in a DDoS situation and it also will not cope
with a user browsing the website through multiple tabs or
users browsing behind a shared NAT IP address.
Hidden decoy links can be avoided by an attacker by
manually creating a viable request flow, software puzzles
affect genuine users quality of service as there are a wide
range of hardware devices connected online with differing
capabilities, also the scheme can also be easily attacked using
purpose designed ASIC hardware [23]. Lastly defence by
offence affects genuine users quality of service which is
unpopular for e-commerce services.
Further innovation involving the defence of DDoS attacks
is required which can accomplish the above criteria otherwise
DDoS attacks will remain a major threat to society. Existing
research treats the server environment as a black box by not
monitoring the inner behaviour of the system therefore the
resources causing the blockage can not be easily seen. There
has been little research involving the generation of novel
DDoS sensors, instead current research focuses on the training
of classifiers using the limited properties available.
DDoS-shield [9] proposed a very basic form of measuring
the servers CPU usage by estimating a workload profile for
each resource, however their method was too simplistic as
for dynamic resources the workload will vary depending on
the complexity of their query or user profile. It will also be
difficult to scale to large websites consisting of thousands
of pages as each resource would need to be continually
individually accessed.
A. Contributions of this paper
We propose a solution which allows real-time insight into
the actual database workload caused by each user. This will
enable the detection of sophisticated DDoS attacks targeting
high value database targets. Our main focus for this research is
to combat the asymmetric database attack vector which aims
to cripple the database servers operating behind the HTTP
server.
Our main contribution is the database monitoring sensors
located on the web server environment. This monitoring
sensor has not been practically demonstrated or modelled
by existing research. We also propose a classifier which can
accurately distinguish between benign users and the attackers.
IV. ATTACK MODEL
Miu et al [24] showed that DDoS attacks were more
effective whilst in the TCP ESTABLISHED state as the
web server could be directly attacked. While in this state,
the attacker can flood the server with HTTP GET webpage
requests or corrupted HTTP POST packets in order to attack
the server’s resources.
HTTP GET attacks are commonly split into three categories:
• Request Flooding Attacks - The attacker sends requests
at a high rate
• Asymmetric Workload attacks - The attacker sends re-
quests that require a computationally expensive response
from the server
• Repeated one shot - The attacker sends requests over a
large number of sessions
A. Asymmetric Attacks
A sophisticated attacker will target the elements of the
service which will cause the most harm. The load of each
website resource varies depending on the computation and
memory lookups required to return a response to the user.
These computation and memory lookups may be carried out
on the same host as the web server, or on a separate server
dedicated to that particular service. In the popular OpenCart e-
commerce software [25], the website interface’s code is stored
on the web server, whilst all of the website data is stored on
a MySQL database application which performs the queries
required to display the website content. Each of these queries
will cause computational strain on the server and it can be
seen in Fig. 1 that within the OpenCart website there is vast
variation in the database computation required to carry out
each of the resources functionality. A sophisticated attacker
aiming to carry out an asymmetric HTTP attack would target
these high value resources overloading the database server.
The resources at risk for this system are:
• Database CPU Power - Database processing power con-
sumed by querying the data stores
• Database/Webserver Connections - Each time a database
connection is opened, a TCP connection between the web
and database server will be established, and the number
of network connections available decreases
• Webserver Threads - If the database server is put under
strain, the response time for the queries will increase
which will cause web server threads to remain open for
longer; this eventually causes a backlog in the request
pool and exhausts the web server’s threadpool; preventing
it from accepting new requests
To understand the threat posed by an attack targeting asym-
metric resources, a test bed running OpenCart was developed
and attacked. The most valuable asymmetric target for the
attack was chosen using Fig 1, which was the search interface
as it requires a high query count and requires the largest
database processing time. The least vulnerable resource to
Fig. 1. Database query statistics for an example OpenCart website
attack would be a static web page, not requiring a database
connection or any computation, therefore a static text HTML
document was placed onto the same server.
It was found that when a 4000 requests/sec attack was
placed against the static HTML page for 1 minute, the
website’s response time was 1.2 seconds, showing negligible
slowdown. In contrast, when an attack of 38 requests/sec was
performed against the website’s search engine, the website’s
response time slowed to 67 seconds. This was not due to the
webserver becoming overloaded, instead it was the back-end
database server that was not able to cope with the traffic. This
shows the benefits of targeting asymmetric resources, as the
search attack required only 1% of the attack frequency of the
static page attack yet caused significantly more damage.
V. SYSTEM DESIGN
As previously discussed, existing research cannot effec-
tively detect low rate asymmetric attacks due to the limited
characteristics available. Our research aims to provide a
solution to this issue by generating new features using a novel
resource consumption sensor located on the server which will
give more in-depth insight into the operations of the system.
Using the sensor produced features, a database resource usage
profile is created for each unique IP address which will allow
a classifier to detect DDoS attackers.
A. Sensor Data Acquisition
The sensor will monitor the load on the database server for
each user. The database server has no method of relating each
query to the originating website user as it only receives the
web server’s IP address as shown in Fig 2, therefore the sensor
must be embedded onto the web server’s database module so
that the sensor will have access to both the query and the
website user’s IP address.
Fig. 2. Data Centre Schematic
As the modification is carried out on the web server
software, no website content needs to be adapted, allowing the
sensor to be installed with ease onto live systems. The sensor
will log when a database is opened and closed and when a
query or commit is performed. A commit is defined as a SQL
command which updates or inserts data into the database. The
time taken for the database to respond to a query or commit is
also recorded so that the load on the server can be estimated.
A summary of the logs produced can be seen in Table I.
TABLE I
GENERATED DATABASE LOG SCHEMATIC
$Time,OpenDB,$UserIP,NULL,$DatabaseName
$Time,COMMIT,$UserIP,$ResponseTime(ms),$URL
$Time,QUERY, $UserIP,$ResponseTime(ms),$URL
$Time,CloseDB,$UserIP,NULL,NULL
Apache is the most common web server application [26]
and has been chosen for this research. The Zend PHP Frame-
work has been used to provide the user with a dynamic web
interface and provide a connection to a back end database
server. This design however should be replicable other web
server technologies.
B. Classification System
To prevent an attacker from consuming the database re-
sources, a classifier will be used to detect misuse. This could
also be implemented using a simple resource quota, however
DDoS could still occur if the attacker keeps below these
limits but instead scales up the number of bots, hence the
required need for a classifier to detect unusual database query
behaviour.
1) Classifier Parameters: The data collected from the
sensors will be pre-processed into features before being passed
into the classifier. The features created from the data are
calculated in timeslots of 30 seconds and are the following:
• Number of Databases Opened
• Number of Databases Closed
• Number of Database Queries
• Number of Database Commits
• Total Database Query Time
• Average Query Time per Database Open
• Average Number of Queries per Database Open
It is common for a website to only open a database once
per resource and close it after it has finished processing the
page, therefore the database open count also represents the
number of http page requests.
2) Classification Algorithm: In order to validate the pro-
posed DDoS sensor features, a classification algorithm has
been used. The classifier chosen for this was the well known
and popularly used decision tree classifier due to the relative
ease of separation of the produced dataset and it’s relatively
quick training time [27]. The trained classifier also has the
inherent benefit of being constructed using standard logic
statements, allowing for the detection system to be easy
implemented onto a live system. The trained classifier can
also be be visually analysed as can be seen in Fig 3, this
helps ensure that the classifier is not overfitted. The dataset
used in this research are labelled using a binary class, 0 for
benign and 1 for malicious. The decision tree recursively splits
this dataset into M regions during the training stage using
a greedy algorithm. Characterisation of the model is carried
out by splitting the dataset using one nominal feature, and
by using the information gain as the splitting criterion. The
grouping boundaries can later be outputted and represented
using a logic tree structure [28] [29]
f(x) =
M∑
m=1
cmI{x ∈ Rm)}
To reduce the complexity of the trained tree and to reduce
the possibility of overfitting, the tree is post-pruned to remove
branches which provide little classification power. The clas-
sifier can be trained with more learners to improve accuracy;
however, this requires a longer training time.
To increase the overall classification accuracy and to reduce
the possible of overfitting, an ensemble of decision tree
classifiers is used. Popular ensemble methods include boosting
and bagging. A boosting ensemble works by weighting the
data in the training set. By adjusting the weights after each
training phase, training records which are difficult to classify
can be given more influence in the learning process, hence
improving the performance of the hypothesis.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Test Bed Architecture
The experiment was carried out on a private cloud envi-
ronment running XenServer to replicate a typical industry
environment. Two VMs were created on separate Xen hosts
and were given Ubuntu 14.04 as the Operating System with
3.5Ghz Dual Core and 2GB RAM. One of the servers was
used to host the MySQL database whilst the other server had
the Apache web server which ran OpenCart to simulate an
e-commerce website.
B. Dataset Generation
To ensure that the system was realistic, the OpenCart
database used in the test bed was obtained from a popular
operational live shop. All datasets were produced against a
website running this operational database.
1) Benign Simulation: To ensure that the test bed is tested
using realistic normal load conditions, 7 days of real traffic
logs from the operational website were replayed against the
test server to generate the database features.
2) Attack Simulation: To determine the best attack patten
against the website, each website resource was analysed to
determine its impact on the database and the search resource
as shown in Fig 1 was the most valuable target. As previously
shown in the attack model section, sending 38 requests/sec-
onds against the search resource managed to put enough strain
on the server to cause a DDoS situation. In a normal situation
there would also be benign traffic causing a base load on the
server therefore only a lower attack rate of 36 requests/second
is required.
In a typical DDoS attack a botnet is used. J. Santanna et al
[30] researched the structure of active botnets and showed that
attacks targeting DNS servers consisted of thousands of nodes,
however due to it being an amplification attack the actual bots
used can only be estimated but it would at least be hundreds.
For our testbed simulation, an attack botnet was created using
360 unique IP addresses, each bot sending 1 request every
Fig. 3. Sample Decision Tree Classifier (Complex Tree)
10 seconds mimicking the typical request rate of a benign
user. To ensure that the behaviour of the benign users during
the DDoS attack were taken into account, a subset of 150 of
the benign dataset users were replayed simultaneously against
the server during the attack. Benign users are required to be
present during the attack to ensure full classifier training, as
query response times for benign users will be larger during
an attack due to database locking. As can be seen in Fig4,
the malicious HTTP Requests (class 1) blended in with the
request rates of the benign users (class 0).
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Fig. 4. HTTP Request Rates for Malicious (1) and Benign Traffic (0)
The response times of the test bed during the attack can
be seen in Fig. 5. These response times were obtained by
performing two curl commands simultaneously against an
HTML document (requiring no database connectivity) and
one of the shop’s product pages (database connectivity). Both
times where recorded to give analysis of how the servers
responded during the attack.
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Fig. 5. Server response time during the attack simulation, Position 1:Start
of attack, Position 2:All servers overloaded, Position 3:Attack End
The benign users were present at time 0 whilst the botnet
started the attack at 20 seconds (position 1) for an attack
duration of 300 seconds, ending their attack at 320 seconds
(position 3). It can clearly be seen by the stability of the initial
response times of the html resource (no database required)
that it was not the web server but the database server that
was affected by the DDoS attack as only dynamic pages
where affected initially, however the backlog caused by the
slow database responses gradually consumed all of the overall
available web server connections which finally resulted in
all server resources to suffer from DDoS from 100 seconds
(position 2) onwards.
C. Decision Tree Classification
The decision tree classifiers was trained using the 7 days
benign dataset and the dataset obtained during the attack. The
raw dataset along with two pre-processed features (Average
Query Count and Average Query Time) were fed into the
classification system. As can be seen in Figs 6, 7 and 8 there
is a discernible difference between malicious users which were
labelled with 1 and benign users which were labelled as 0.
0 5 10 15
Open Count
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Av
er
ag
e 
Qu
er
y C
ou
nt
0
1
Fig. 6. Open count vs AVG Query Count for Malicious (1) and Benign (0)
With a basic complex tree classifier, the system had a
overall accuracy of 97.4%. To increase the overall accuracy,
Bagged, Boosted, LogitBoost, GentleBoost and RUSBoost en-
semble classifiers using cross validation were trained against
the dataset. The Boosted Trees classifier was chosen due
it having the best accuracy whilst using a low numbers
of learners. A lower number of learners will require less
computational power in the training of the classifier; therefore
the optimum value of 20 was decided upon. On the training
machine (Intel Xeon 4 Core, 8 Threads @ 3.70 GHz) using
20 learners, the classifier was trained in under 3.3 seconds.
Table II shows the accuracy of the boosted ensemble
classifier for timeslots of 30 seconds. There is a relatively
low overall false detection rate of 2.1% which results in a
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Fig. 8. Database Query Times for Malicious (1) and Benign (0)
small number of benign users being affected by a defence
mechanism. The boosted ensemble tree classifier gave a
overall accuracy of 97.9% for this attack type, a false negative
of 2.0% and a false positive of 2.2%.
As the system was attacked using 1 request per 10 seconds,
even if the attacker instead wished to perform a DDoS at a
higher attack frequency, the system will also be capable of
detecting this as it is still well above the trained threshold.
TABLE II
BOOSTED ENSEMBLE TREE CONFUSION MATRIX
Predicted Class
True Class Benign (0) Malicious (1)
Benign (0) 97.8% 2.2%
Malicious (1) 2.0% 98.0%
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Current application layer DDoS research has become stale
due to the lack of innovation involving the generation of
new features, and as such successful defence mechanisms
for asymmetric application layer DDoS attacks have not
been achieved. In this paper, we brought new properties and
characteristics to the research field by developing a new sensor
which can monitor the database server’s behaviour for each of
the website’s users. These new features enable the detection
of slow rate asymmetric attacks targeting database resources.
Using a boosted ensemble tree, we have shown that using
these new features, our detection system can detect sophisti-
cated DDoS attackers targeting large database resources even
at low request rates of 1 website request every 10 seconds. The
experimental results presented validates the proposed feature
extraction method and provides a robust feature set for the
detection of low rate asymmetric database DDoS attacks. The
detection tool developed also uses very little computational
power to train and does not introduce any additional resource
strain on the web server during normal use or during the attack
which makes it a practical and effective defence mechanism.
Our research assumes users are shoppers, however admin-
istrative users may be present on a system, who may generate
large legitimate workloads. To minimise the risk of false
positives, we envisage the mitigation system will only be
enabled under DDoS/critical load, and for IP whitelisting to be
enabled for authorised high consumption administrative users.
It is anticipated that the proposed approach may force the
attacker to shift to mimicking a benign user by attacking
requests with lower database usage. This attack however will
require larger request rates to DDoS the system, hence turning
the attack into a HTTP Flood which is easily detected by
existing detection methods.
Our next aim is to complement existing DDoS request rate
methods and to provide an extended detection approach, ad-
vancing detection accuracy and robustness of known applica-
tion layer DDoS attacks including attacks targeting webserver
computational resources and complex regexes. The research
produced in this paper significantly extends the feature sets
available for the detection of application layer DDoS attacks.
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